I was surprised even astonished by the initial reaction to Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. When the book was published in 1975, I expected a favorable reaction from other biologists. After all, my colleagues and I had merely been extending neo-Darwinism into the study of social behavior and animal societies, and the underlying biological principles we employed were largely conventional. The response was in fact overwhelmingly favorable. From the social scientists, I expected not much reaction. I took it for granted that the human species is subject to sociobiological analysis no less than to genetic or endocrinological analysis; the final chapter of my book simply completed the catalogue of social species by adding Homo sapiens. I hoped to make a contribution to the social sciences and humanities by laying out, in immediately accessible form, the most relevant methods and principles of population biology, evolutionary theory, and sociobiology. I expected that many social scientists, already convinced of the necessity of a biological foundation for their subject, would be tempted to pick up the tools and try them out. This has occurred to a limited extent, but there has also been stiff resistance. I now understand that I entirely underestimated the Durkheim-Boas tradition of autonomy of the social sciences, as well as the strength and power of the anti genetic bias that has prevailed as virtual dogma since the fall of Social Darwinism.
I did not even think about the Marxists. When the attacks on sociobiology came from Science for the People, the leading radical left group within American science, I was unprepared for a largely ideological argument. It is now clear to me that I was tampering with something fundamental: mythology. Evolutionary theory applied to social systems is an extension of the great Western traditions of scientific materialism. As such, it threatens to transform into testable hypotheses the assumptions about human nature made by some Marxist philosophers. Its first line of evidence is not favorable to those assumptions, insofar as most traditional Marxists cling to a vision of human nature as a relatively unstructured phenomenon swept along by economic forces extraneous to human biology. Marxism and other secular ideologies previously rested secure as unchallenged satrapies of scientific materialism; now they were in danger of being displaced by other, less manageable biological explanations. The remarkably harsh response of Science for the People is an example of what Hans Kung  has called the fully of the theologians.
But much of the confusion has come from a simple misunderstanding of the content of sociobiology. Sociobiology is defined as the systematic study of the biological basis of all forms of social behavior, including sexual and parental behavior, in all kinds of organisms including humans. As such, it is a discipline an inevitable discipline, since there must be a systematic study of social behavior. Sociobiology consists mostly of zoology. About 90 percent of its current material concerns animals, even though over 90 percent of the attention given to sociobiology by nonscientists, and especially journalists, is due to its possible applications to the study of human social behavior. There is nothing unusual about deriving principles and methods, and even terminology, from intensive examinations of lower organisms and applying them to the study of human beings. Most of the fundamental principles of genetics and biochemistry applied to human biology are based on colon bacteria, fruit flies, and white rats. To say that the same science can be applied to human beings is not to reduce humanity to the status of these simpler creatures.
Nor is there anything new or surprising about having such a discipline within the family of the biological sciences. The term sociobiology was used independently by John P. Scott in 1946 and by Charles F. Hockett in 1948, but the word was not picked up immediately by others. In 1950, Scott, who had been serving as secretary of the small but influential Committee for the Study of Animal Behavior, suggested sociobiology more formally as a term for the interdisciplinary science which lies between the fields of biology (particularly ecology and physiology) and psychology and sociology. From 1956 to 1964, Scott and others constituted the Section on Animal Behavior and Sociobiology of the Ecological Society of America [ESA]. This Section became the present Animal Behavior Society. During 1950-1970, sociobiology was employed intermittently in technical articles, a usage evidently inspired by its already quasi-official status. But other expressions, such as biosociology and animal sociology, were also employed. When I wrote the final chapter of The Insect Societies , which was entitled The Prospect for a Unified Sociobiology and when I wrote Sociobiology: The New Synthesis , where I suggested that a discrete discipline should now be built on a foundation of genetics and population biology, I selected the term sociobiology rather than some other, novel expression because I believed it would already be familiar to most students of animal behavior and hence more likely to be accepted.
Pure sociobiological theory, being independent of human biology, does not imply by itself that human social behavior is determined by genes. It allows for any one of three possibilities. One is that the human brain has evolved to the point that it has become an equipotential learning machine entirely determined by culture. The mind, in other words, has been freed from the genes. A second possibility is that human social behavior is under genetic constraint but that all of the genetic variability within the human species has been exhausted. Hence our behavior is to some extent influenced by genes, but we all have exactly the same potential. A third possibility, close to the second, is that the human species is prescribed to some extent but also displays some genetic differences among individuals. As a consequence, human populations retain the capacity to evolve still further in their biological capacity for social behavior.
I consider it virtually certain that the third alternative is the correct one. Because the evidence has been well reviewed in other recent works, most notably by Napoleon Chagnon and William Irons, Irven DeVore, and Daniel G. Freedman, I will not undertake to exemplify it or review it in detail. Instead, let me outline its content.
More complex forms of human behavior are almost certainly under the control of polygenes (genes scattered on many chromosome loci), which in turn create their effects through alternating a wide array of mediating devices, from elementary neuronal wiring to muscular coordination and mental set induced by hormone levels. In most instances, the role of behavioral polygenes can be evaluated butonly qualitatively by the careful application of twin and adoption studies. The most frequently used method is to compare the similarity between identical twins, who are known to be genetically identical, with the similarity between fraternal twins, who are no closer genetically than ordinary siblings. When the similarity between identical twins proves greater, this distinction between the two kinds of twins is ascribed to heredity. Using this and related techniques, geneticists have found evidence of a substantial amount of hereditary influence on the development of a variety of traits that affect social behavior, including number ability, word fluency, memory, the timing of language acquisition, sentence construction, perceptual skill, psychomotor skill, extroversion and introversion, homosexuality, the timing of first heterosexual activity, and certain forms of neurosis and psychosis, including the manic-depressive syndrome and schizophrenia.
In most instances, there is a flaw in the results that renders most of them less than definitive: Identical twins are commonly treated more alike by their parents than are fraternal twins. They are instructed in a more nearly parallel manner, dressed more alike, and so forth. In the absence of better controls, it is possible that the greater similarity of identical twins could, after all, be due to environmental influences and not their genetic identity. However, new and more sophisticated studies have begun to take account of this additional factor. Loehlin and Nichols, for example, analyzed many aspects of the environments and performances of 850 sets of twins who took the National Merit Scholarship test in 1962. The early histories of the subjects, as well as the attitudes and rearing practices of the parents, were taken into account. The results showed that the generally more similar treatment of the identical twins cannot account for their greater similarity in general abilities and personality traits or even in ideals; goals, and vocational interests. It is evident that either the similarities are based in substantial part on genetic identity or else environmental agents were at work that remained hidden to Loehlin and Nichols.
My overall conclusion from the existing information is that Homo sapiens is a typical animal species with reference to the quality and magnitude of the genetic diversity affecting its behavior. I also believe that it will soon be within our ability to locate and characterize specific genes that alter the more complex forms of social behavior. Obviously, the alleles discovered will not prescribe different dialects or modes of dress. They are more likely to work measurable changes through their effects on learning modes and timing, cognitive and neuromuscular ability, and the personality traits most sensitive to hormonal mediation. If social scientists and sociobiologists somehow choose to ignore this line of investigation, they will soon find human geneticists coming up on their blind side. The intense interest in medical genetics, fueled now by new methods such as the electrophoretic separation of proteins and rapid sequencing of amino acids, has resulted in an acceleration of discoveries in human heredity that is certain to have profound consequences for the study of genetics of social behavior.
I wish now to take up the concerns expressed about human sociobiology in the chapters to follow in Sociobiology and Human Nature. Most have been expressed by other authors in one form or another before the NEXA conference. I have no desire to rebut specific points raised by individual authors. This would in any case be unfair by the ordinary canons of debate, and Sociobiology and Human Nature surely is a debate. Rather, I want to discuss in broader terms the ways in which the several intellectual traditions represented so well by the other contributors might be reconciled with the relatively uncompromising biological approach I have taken up to the present time.
The first area of conflict that can be resolved is the relation of genes to culture. Many social scientists see no value in sociobiology because they are persuaded that variation among cultures has no genetic basis. Their premise is right, their conclusion wrong. We can do well to remember Rousseaus dictum that those who wish to study humans should stand close, while those who wish to study humanity should look from afar. The social scientist is interested in the often microscopic, but important, variations in behavior that almost everyone agrees are due to culture and the environment. The sociobiologist is interested in the more general features of human nature and the limitations that exist in the environmentally induced variation. He or she is especially interested in the fact that, although all cultures taken together constitute a very great amount of variation, their total content is far less than that displayed by the remaining species of social animals. By comparing the diagnostic features of human organization with those of other primate species, the sociobiologist aims to reconstruct the earliest evolutionary history of social organization and to discern its genetic residues in contemporary societies. The approach is entirely complementary to that of the social sciences and in no way diminishes their importance quite the contrary.
Those immersed in the rich lore of the social sciences sometimes reject human sociobiology because it is reductionistic. But almost all of the great advances of science have been made by reduction, in the form of conjectures that are often bold and momentarily premature. Theoretical physics transformed chemistry, chemistry transformed cell biology and genetics, natural selection theory transformed ecology all by stark reduction, which at first seemed inadequate to the task. Reduction is a method by which new mechanisms and relational processes are discovered. In the most successful case histories of postulational-deductive science, propositions are expressed in forms that can be elaborated into precise, testable models. The other side of reduction, the antithesis of the thesis, is synthesis. As the new principles and equations are validated by repeated testing, they are used in an attempt to reconstitute the full array of the subjects phenomena. Karl Popper  has correctly suggested that philosophical reductionism is wrong but that methodological reductionism is necessary for the advancement of science. Here is how I tried to summarize the role of sociobiological reduction in an earlier review [Wilson 1977:138]:
Some critics have objected to the drawing of analogies between animal and human behavior, especially as it entails the same terminology to describe phenomena across species. This reservation has always struck me as insubstantial. The definitions and limitations of the concepts of analogy and homology have been well worked out by evolutionary biologists, and it is difficult to imagine why the same reasoning cannot be extended with proper care to the human species. We already speak of the octopus eye and the human eye, insect copulation and human copulation, and earthworm learning and human learning, even though in each of these cases the two species are in different superphyla, and the traits listed were independently evolved. The questions of interest are in fact the degrees of convergence and the processes of natural selection that made the convergence so close. When biologists compare altruism in the honeybee worker with human altruism, no one seriously believes that they are based on homologous genes or that they are identical in detail. Slavery practiced by Polyergus and Strongylognathus ants resembles human slavery in some broad features and differs from it in others, as well as in most details of its execution. By using the same term for such comparisons, the biologist calls attention to the fact that some degree of convergence has occurred and invites an analysis of all the causes of similarity and difference. There is a Greek-derived term for insect slavery dulosis but its usage outside entomology would not only complicate language but would also slow the very comparative analysis that is of greatest interest.
I am most puzzled by the occasional demurral that sociobiology distracts our attention from the real needs of the world. The questions are raised, How can we worry about the origins of human nature when the nuclear sword hangs over us? When people are starving in the Sahel and in Bangladesh and political prisoners are rotting in Argentinian jails? In response, one can answer, Do we want to know, in depth and with any degree of confidence, why we care? And, after these problems have been solved, what then? The highest goals professed by governments everywhere are human fulfillment above the animal level and the realization of individual potential. But what is fulfillment, and to what ends can potential be expanded? I suggest that only a deeper understanding of human nature, which must be developed from neurobiological investigations of the brain and the phylogenetic reconstruction of the species-specific properties of human behavior, can provide humanity with the perspective it requires to formulate its highest social goals.
The excitement of sociobiology comes from the promise of the role it will play in this new humanistic investigation. Its potential importance beyond zoology lies in its logical position as the bridging discipline between the natural sciences on the one side and social sciences and humanities on the other. For years, the chief spokespersons of the natural sciences to Western high culture have been physicists, astronomers, geneticists, and molecular biologists articulate and persuasive scholars whose understanding of the evolution of the brain and of social behavior was unfortunately minimal. Their perception of values and the human condition was almost entirely intuitive and hence scarcely better than that of other intelligent laypersons. Biology has been employed as a science that accounts for the human body; it concerns itself with technological manifestations such as the conquest of disease, the green revolution, energy flow in ecosystems and the cost-benefit analysis of gene splicing. Natural scientists have by and large conceded social behavior to be biologically unstructured and hence the undisputed domain of the social sciences. For their part, most social scientists have granted that human nature has a biological foundation, but they have regarded it as of marginal interest to there splendent variations in culture that hold their professional attention.
In order for the fabled gap between the two cultures to be truly bridged, social theory must incorporate the natural sciences into its foundations, and for that to occur biology must deal systematically with social behavior. This competence is now being approached through the two-pronged advance of neurobiology which boldly hopes to explain the physical basis of mind, and sociobiology, which aims to reconstruct the evolutionary history of human nature. Sociobiology in particular is still a rudimentary science. Its relevance to human social systems is still largely unexplored. But in the gathering assembly of disciplines it holds the greatest promise of speaking the common language.
2. Edward O. Wilson: Science and Ideology: I had been blindsided by the attack. Having expected some frontal fire from social scientists on primarily evidential grounds, I had received instead a political enfilade from the flank. A few observers were surprised that I was surprised. John Maynard Smith, a senior British evolutionary biologist and former Marxist, said that he disliked the last chapter of Sociobiology himself and it was also absolutely obvious to me I cannot believe Wilson didnt know that this was going to provoke great hostility from American Marxists, and Marxists everywhere. But it was true that I didnt know. I was unprepared perhaps because, as Maynard Smith further observed, I am an American rather than a European. In 1975 I was a political naive: I knew almost nothing about Marxism as either a political belief or a mode of analysis; I had paid little attention to the dynamism of the activist Left, and I had never heard of Science for the People. I was not an intellectual in the European or New York/Cambridge sense. … After the Sociobiology Study Group exposed me as a counterrevolutionary adventurist, and as they intensified their attacks in articles and teach-ins, other radical activists in the Boston area, including the violence-prone International Committee against Racism, conducted a campaign of leaflets and teach-ins of their own to oppose human sociobiology. As this activity spread through the winter and spring of 1975-76, I grew fearful that it might reach a level embarrassing to my family and the university. I briefly considered offers of professorships from three universities in case, their representatives said, I wished to leave the physical center of the controversy. But the pressure was tolerable, since I was a senior professor with tenure, with a reputation based on other discoveries, and in any case could not bear to leave Harvards ant collection, the world's largest and best. For a few days a protester in Harvard Square used a bullhorn to call for my dismissal. Two students from the University of Michigan invaded my class on evolutionary biology one day to shout slogans and deliver antisociobiology monologues. I withdrew from department meetings for a year to avoid embarrassment arising from my notoriety, especially with key members of Science for the People present at these meetings. In 1979 I was doused with water by a group of protestors at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, possibly the only incident in recent history that a scientist was physically attacked, however mildly, for the expression of an idea. In 1982 I went to the Science Center at Harvard University under police escort to deliver a public lecture, because of the gathering of a crowd of protestors around the entrance, angered because of the title of my talk: The coevolution of biology and culture.
3. Napoleon A. Chagnon / William Irons (eds.)  Evolutionary biology and human social behavior: an anthropological perspective.
4. Irven Devore : The Biology of Human Evolution.
In: Human Diversity: Its Causes and Social Significance, B. D. Davis and P. Flaherty, eds., Ballinger Publ., Cambridge, Massachusetts pp. 21-36.
5. Daniel G. Freedman  The Social and the Biological: A Necessery Unity
In: Zygon - Journal of Religion and Science, 15(2):117-131.
This paper was presented at a symposium (Value Affirmations and Scientific Fact: New Light on Is/Ought) sponsored by the Institute on Religion in an Age of Science and Rollins College and held in conjunction with the meetings of the American Academy of Religion, New York, New York, November 16–17, 1979.
6. Joseph Shepher  Mate selection among second generation kibbutz adolescents and adults: Incest avoidance and negative imprinting.
In: Archives of Sexual Behavior 1 (4): 293–307.
7. Mildred Dickemann  The ecology of Mating Systems in Hypergynous Dowry Societies.
In: Social Science Information 18(2).
8. William Irons  Cultural and biological success.
In: N. Chagnon & W. Irons (eds.) Evolutionary Biology and Human Social Behavior: An Anthropological Perspective pp 284–302. North Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press.
9. N.A. Chagnon  Mate Competition, Favoring Close kin, and Village Fissioning Among the Yanomamõ Indians
In: Napoleon A. Chagnon / William Irons (eds) Evolutionary Biology and Human Social Behavior: An Anthropological Perspective, pp. 86-132. North Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press.
10. W.H. Durham  The xx Significance of Cultural Behavior
In: Human Ecology, 4(2): 89-121.
Durham investigated the Mundurucú headhunters of the Amazon. The Mudurucú people seem the be extremely aggressiev war is considered an essential and unquestioned part of their life, and foreign tribes are attacked because they are enemies by definition. The Mundurucú even speak of the non-Mundurucú in the same way as when speaking of animals they kill for food. Dunham argues that the Mundurucú warfare strategies have evolved because they are the strategies that best increase the inclusive genetic fitness of the members of the tribe. The main reason why the Mundurucú are so aggressive, seems to be, according to Durham, that the number of Mundurucú (and thereby also the number of Mundurucú genes) is limited by a shortage of high-quality protein that is only supplied by game, especially peccaries, in nearby rain forests. Hunting is a major daily occupation of the men and they compete for the resources with surrounding tribes. If these competitors are decimated by murderous attacks, the Mundurucú share of the forests yield of game is correspondingly increased. And so, by natural selection, the aggressive behavior evolves under these particular circumstances. Durham supports his argument with a mathematical model that helps him present a set of conditions under which primitive wars (i.e. conflict between groups) could evolve and be maintained.
11. Robin Fox  Kinship and Marriage: An Anthropological Perspective
12. Melvin J. Konner  Aspects of the developmental ethology of a foraging people.
In: N.G. Blurton Jones (ed.), Ethological Studies of Child Behavior. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. See also: Wikipedia: Melvin Konner
13. Daniel G. Freedman  Bio-social approach to human development, pp.563-601.
14. James D. Weinrich  Human sociobiology: Pair-bonding and resource predictability (effects of social class and race).
In: Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 2(2): 91–118. See also: Wikipedia: James D. Weinrich
15. Victor A. McKusick / Frank H. Ruddle  The status of the gene map of the human chromosomes
In: Science, 196(4288):390–405.
16. J.C. Loehlin & R.C. Nichols  Heredity, environment, and personality: A study of 850 sets of twins
Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
17. Ernst Mach,  The science of mechanics: A critical and historicalll account of its development (6th English ed.). LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court. (1st English ed., 1893), p. 586.
18. The »enchanted loom« is a famous metaphor for the brain invented by the pioneering neuroscientist Charles S. Sherrington in a passage from his 1940 book Man on his nature, in which he poetically describes his conception of what happens in the cerebral cortex during arousal from sleep: The great topmost sheet of the mass, that where hardly a light had twinkled or moved, becomes now a sparkling field of rhythmic flashing points with trains of traveling sparks hurrying hither and thither. The brain is waking and with it the mind is returning. It is as if the Milky Way entered upon some cosmic dance. Swiftly the head mass becomes an enchanted loom where millions of flashing shuttles weave a dissolving pattern, always a meaningful pattern though never an abiding one; a shifting harmony of subpatterns. The »loom« he refers to was undoubtedly meant to be a Jacquard loom, used for weaving fabric into complex patterns.