| SocioSite | Sociologists | Subjects | Search | Correspondents | NetSociology | About | Contact |
|---|
Although the Tofflers are often thought of as the world's most famous futurologists, two words that are definitely not in their vocabulary are "predict" and "trend". "We believe nobody can predict the future," says Alvin. "We'll read the stuff that comes out of mathematical models, but we'll read it with a degree of skepticism. What we have constructed is a model of historical and social change."
That model is seen most clearly in The Third Wave, which maps out three gigantic waves of change. The First Wave corresponds to the agricultural revolution which dominated human history for thousands of years. The Second Wave - industrial civilization - is now playing itself out after 300 years of dominance. The Third Wave is crashing over us right now, having started with the birth of a postindustrial, high-technology, information economy in the 1950s.
The transforming power of technology always plays a central role in the Tofflers' books, but their first love was not science. Both studied English at New York University and then plunged into the Bohemian world of postwar Greenwich Village, writing poetry and planning novels. ``I was your typical liberal arts student. Math and science were absolutely the subject that gave me the most difficulty. But for some reason, I knew at a very young age that technology was important, that science was important, and so I took a course in the history of technology and then read, read and read.''
The Tofflers' interest in technology (plus early left-wing leanings) even extended to working on a factory production line in their New York days. After that came years of journalism, with the Tofflers writing for everyone from Fortune and Playboy to the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, and acquiring a ``dogmatic belief in never becoming dogmatic''. Then, in the 1960s, the Tofflers were asked to write a paper for IBM on the long-term social and organizational implications of the computer. That gave them a period of immersion in technology. Future Shock followed soon afterwards, when they were living in Washington DC and Alvin was working as a correspondent for a Pennsylvania newspaper.
Our ideas came together in 1965 in an article called ``The future as a way of life'', which argued that change was going to accelerate and that the speed of change could induce disorientation in lots of people. We coined the phrase ``future shock'' as an analogy to the concept of culture shock. With future shock you stay in one place but your own culture changes so rapidly that it has the same disorienting effect as going to another culture.
If I had studied economics I would have been taught that the factors of production are land, labour and capital. ``Knowledge'' doesn't appear. Today, knowledge not only must appear in that list, it dominates the others. If you have the right knowledge at the right place at the right time, that means less labour, less energy, less capital, less raw materials and less time. All the other inputs of economic production for the conversion of natural elements into what we call wealth can be done far more effectively and efficiently through the application of knowledge.
Europe has made a number of fundamental strategic errors and they have a lot to do with the Common Market and the European Union. One of the things that has always struck me as absolutely stupid has been the contrast between the billions of dollars of subsidy for agriculture and the pennies put aside for research, Research budgets have been - in contrast with the US - minimal. And at a time when every major company is trying to flatten the hierarchy, the European Union takes 12 bureaucracies and puts another one on top. At a time when we are discovering that small businesses are more renumerable [sic], the Brussels folks still think in terms of economies of scale.
The European Union should not be a bureaucratic, nation-based union - it will have to be a Europe of regions. And it will have to recognize the importance of science and technology much more than even now, and it will have to break up the remaining centralized PTTs and accelerated the development of the electronic infrastructure.
The Industrial Revolution did not simply industrialize the economy, it industrialized warfare. The machine age gave us the machine gun. Societies organized around mass-production, culminated in nuclear weapons, the ultimate in mass destruction. We argue that to the degree that knowledge is in fact becoming central to the new economy, it is also becoming central to the new form of war. The US Air Force has just bought 300,000 personal computers. There will be more computers in the armies of the world than there will be guns. Just as in the economy you need skilled workers, you need skilled soldiers.
One of the things we discovered in writing this book was that you need smart generals. The generals we met researching this book, are super, supersmart. They have studied everything from aerospace to computer sciences to international relations. That came as a revelation to us. Never having had much contact with the military, we shared the common stereotypes.
The other thing that interested us in the book was how an institution as large and recalcitrant to change as the US military went from complete demoralization after Vietnam - drug-drenched, bureaucratic, bloated and despised - to its performance in the Gulf War. If you can speak of war as elegant, that was elegant.
They could shut down every computer, they could shut down the banking system, the ATM machines, the hospitals, transportation systems. You only need one superhacker, he could work for Terhan, he could work for Zhirinovsky. So it isn't that the West or the US in particular has this lifetime lead. On the contrary, I think we are exceedingly vulnerable and the vulnerability is magnified by the ignorance of the public and the self-confidence. You know: ``We won the Gulf War, look how well we did, we can do that to anybody, any place.''
For fifty years, the model was the Cold War and that explained everything. Now it's the end of the Cold War that explained everything. And if we look back on this period in a hundred years from now, the historians will say, yes, there was this thing called the Cold War - it was like some big tribal conflict in ancient times, they had these big bombs they could kill each other with. But in fact the most important thing that happened in that period was the emergence of a new civilization. You can call it postindustrial, Third Wave, or technotronic.
Basically the change in the relationship of knowledge to production and other social processes means that everything has begun to change. It has cultural dimensions, religious dimensions, and certainly scientific dimensions. You're getting models of change that are what I would call essentially Third Wave models, certainly not mechanistic.
Heidi and I are asked all over the world, "Can we become Third Wave and stay Chinese, or English, or Mexican?" The answer is you can't stay anything. The Third Wave permits and even encourages cultural diversity. You can define your own unique culture, but it isn't going to be the culture of the past and it's going to be configured out of elements that come into your culture from outside.
When you have messages beamed to you automatically translated into your own language, and you watch television from Nigeria, or Fiji, or anywhere in the world, gradually yo pluck pieces or elements from those cultures and you put them together. Then you create your own unique English-of-the-future culture, or Japanese-of-the-future culture. People do not simply relive the past.
| SocioSite | Sociologists | Subjects | Search | Correspondents | NetSociology | About | Contact |
|---|