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dr. Albert Benschop
University of Amsterdam

Literatuur bij:
"Transactiekosten in de
Economische Sociologie"

  1. Abolafia, Mitchell [1996]
    Making Markets: Opportunism and Restraint on Wall Street.
    Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

  2. Alchian, Armen
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      Il Politico 30, 816-29, geciteerd uit Alchian 1977.

    • [1977]Economic Forces at Work.
      Indianapolis: Liberty Press.

  3. Alchian, Armen/Demsetz, Harold [1972]
    Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization.
    American Economic Review 62:777-95. Opgenomen in: Demsetz 1988.

  4. Aoki, M. [1984]
    The Co-operative Game Theory of the Firm.
    Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  5. Arrow, Kenneth J.
      [1951] Social Choice and Individual Values. New York: John Wiley.

    • [1971] Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing. Chicago: Markham.

    • [1972] Gifts and Exchanges. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1(4): 343-62.

  6. Bader, Veit [1991]
    Collectief handelen. Sociale ongelijkheid en collectief handelen. Deel 2.
    Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff.

  7. Bader, V.M./Benschop, A. [1988]
    Ongelijk-Heden. Protheorie van sociale ongelijkheid en collectief handelen. Deel 1.
    Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff.

  8. Barnard, Chester [1937]
    The Functions of the Executive.

  9. Bartlett, F.C. [1932]
    Cambridge, Eng.: The University Press.

  10. Bauer, M./Cohen, E. [1983]
    The Invisibility of Power in Economics: Beyond Markets and Hierarchies.
    In: Francis/Turk/Wilman (1983) Power, Efficiency and Institutions. London: Heinemann, pp. 81-104

  11. Benschop, Albert

  12. Biggart, Nicole W., (ed.) [2002]
    Readings in Economic Sociology.
    Cambridge: Blackwell.

  13. Boulding. Kenneth E. [1969]
    Economics as a Moral Sciene.
    American Economic Review 59(1):1-12.

  14. Braverman, Harry [1974]
    Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentiets Century.
    New York: Monthly Review Press.

  15. Callon, Michel (ed.) [1998]
    The Laws of the Markets.
    Oxford: Blackwell.

  16. Cetina, Karin Knorr/Preda, Alex (ed.) [2004]
    The Sociology of Financial Markets.
    Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  17. Ciborra, C.U. [1993]
    Teams, Markets and Systems.
    Cambridge UP.

  18. Coase, Ronald H.
    • [1937/52] The Nature of the Firm |
      Oorspr. in: Economica 4 (1937): 386-405. Geciteerd uit: G.J. Stigler/K.E. Boulding (eds.) Readings in Price Theory. Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin.

    • [1960] The Problem of Social Cost |
      Journal of Law and Economics 3:1-44.

    • [1984] The New Institutional Economics.
      Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 140:229-31.

    • [1988] The Firm, the Market and the Law. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

  19. Coleman, James, S. [1990]
    Foundations of Social Theory.
    Cambridge: Harvard Unib. Press.

  20. Commons, John R.
    • [1897] Natural Selection, Social Selection, and Heredity.
      The Arena 18: 90–7. Reprinted in Geoffrey M. Hodgson [1998] The Foundations of Evolutionary Economics: 1890–1973, 2 vols. Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar.

    • [1899] A Sociological View of Sovereignty.
      American Journal of Sociology 5(1–3).
      Opgenomen in: John R. Commons [1965] A Sociological View of Sovereignty. New York: Augustus Kelley.

    • [1924] Legal Foundations of Capitalism
      New York: Macmillan.

    • [1931] Institutional Economics
      American Economic Review 21(4): 648–57.

    • [1934] Institutional Economics -Its Place in Political Economy.
      Madison: University of Wisconson.

  21. Conner, K.R. [1991]
    A historical comparison of resource based theory and five schools of thought witin industrial organization economics: Do we have a new theory of the firm?
    Journal of Management 17: 121-54.

  22. Cyert, Richard M./March, James J. [1963]
    A Behavioral Theory of the Firm. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

  23. DiMaggio, Paul, (ed.) [2001]
    The Twenty-First-Century Firm: Changing Economic Organization in International Perspective.
    Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

  24. Doeringer, Peter B./Piore, Michael J. [1971]
    Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis.
    Lexington, MA.: Heath.

  25. Dobbin, Frank
    • [2004] The New Economic Sociology: A Reader.
      New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

    • [2004] The Sociology of the Economy.
      New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

  26. Douma, S./Schreuders, H. [1991]
    Economic Approaches to Organizations.
    New York: Prentice-Hall.

  27. Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. [1989]
    Agency- and Institutional Theory Explanations: The Case of Retail Sales Compensation.
    Academy of Management Journal 31: 488-511.

  28. Fama, Eugene F. [1980]
    Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm.
    Journal of Political Economy 88: 288-307.

  29. Fama, Eugine F. [1980]
    Agency problems and the theory of the firm.
    Journal of Political Economy 88:288-307.

  30. Fama, Eugene F./Jensen, Michael C. [1983]
    Separation of ownership and Control.
    Journal of Law and Economics 26: 301-26.

  31. Fligstein, Neil
    • [1990] The Transformations of Corporate Control.
      Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    • [2001] The Architecture of Markets: An Economic Sociology of Twenty-First-Century Capitalist Societies.
      Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

  32. Francis, Arthur/Turk, Jeremy/Willman, Paul (eds.) [1983]
    Power, Efficiency and Institutions: A Critical Appraisal of the `Markets and Hierarchies'
    Paradigm. London: Heinemann.

  33. Goffman, Ervin [1969]
    Strategic Interaction.
    Philadephia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

  34. Guillen, Mauro F. / Collins, Randall /England, Paula / Meyer, Marshall (eds.) [2002]
    The New Economic Sociology: Developments in an Emerging Field.
    New York: Sage.

  35. Hannan, M.T./Freeman, J. [1989]
    Organizational Econology.
    Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

  36. Hart, M. [1979]
    Why the Bosses Love the Closed Shop.
    New Society febr. 1979:352-5.

  37. Hill, Charles, W.L. [1996]
    The Organizational Advantage: The Firm as an Engine for the Discovery of Knowledge

  38. Hodgson, Geoffrey M.
    • [1999] Evolution and Institutions: On Evolutionary Economics and the Evolution of Economics.
      Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar.

    • [2000] What Is the Essence of Institutional Economics?
      Journal of Economic Issues 34(2): 317–29.

    • [2001] How Economics Forgot History: The Problem of Historical Specificity in Social Science.
      London and New York: Routledge.

    • [2002a] The Legal Nature of the Firm and the Myth of the Firm-Market Hybrid.
      International Journal of the Economics of Business 9(1): 37–60.

    • [2002b] Darwinism in Economics: From Analogy to Ontology.
      Journal of Evolutionary Economics 12(2): 259–81.

    • [2003a] The Hidden Persuaders: Institutions and Individuals in Economic Theory.
      Cambridge Journal of Economics 27(2): 159–75.

    • [2003b] John R. Commons and the Foundations of Institutional Economics
      Journal of Economic Issues, 37(3): 547-576.

    • [2004] The Evolution of Institutional Economics: Agency, Structure, and Darwinism in American Institutionalism.
      London and New York: Routledge.

    • [2014] On fuzzy frontiers and fragmented foundations: some reflections on the original and new institutional economics.
      Journal of Institutional Economics 10: 591-611.

  39. Jensen, M.C. / Meckling, W. [1976]
    The theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and capital structure.
    Journal of Financial Economics 3: 305-60.

  40. Knight, Frank H. [1921/71]
    Risk, Uncertainty and Profit.
    Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

  41. Kornai, J. [1971]

  42. Leblebici, Huseyln [1985]
    Transactions and Organizational Forms: A Re-analysis.
    Organization Studies 6(2): 97-115.

  43. Leifer, Eric M./Harrision C. White [1987]
    A Structural Approach to Markets.
    In: Mizruchi/Schwartz 1987.

  44. Macneil, Ian R. [1974]
    The many futures of contracts.
    Southern California Law Review 47: 691-816.

  45. March, James G./Simon, Herbert A. [1958]
    New York: Wiley.

  46. March, James G./Shipira, Z. [1987]
    Managerial perspectives on risk and risk taking.
    Management Science 13: 1404-18.

  47. Marglin, S.A. [1978]
    What do the Bosses do? The Origins and Functions of Hierarchy in Capitalist Production.
    In: Gorz 1978:13-54.

  48. Marschak, Jakob [1968]
    Economics of Inquiring, Communicating, Deciding.
    American Economic Review 58:1-18.

  49. Marschak, Jakob/Radner, Roy [1972]
    Economic Theory of Teams.
    New Haven: Yale University.

  50. McGuire, Roy Radner (eds.)
    Decision and Organization.
    New York: American Elsevier.

  51. Meade, J.E. [1964]
    Efficiency and the Ownership of Property.

  52. Menger, Carl [1871]
    Grundsätze der Volkwirtschaftslehre.
    Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr.
    Published in English as Principles of Economics. New York: New York University Press, 1981.

  53. Milgrom, P. / Roberts, J.
    • [1987] Informational assymetry, strategic behavior, and industrial organization.
      American Economic Review 77:184-93.

    • [1990] Bargaining costs, influence costs, and the organization of economic activity.
      In: J.A. Alt/K.A. Shepsle [1990] Perspectives on Positive Political Economy.
      Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  54. Nelson, R.R./Winter, S.G. [1982]
    An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change.
    Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press.

  55. North, Douglas C.
    • [1977] Markets and Other Allocation Systems in History: The Challenge of Karl Polanyi.
      In: Journal of European Economic History 6: 703-16.

    • [1990] Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  56. North, Douglas C./Thomas, Robert Paul [1973]
    The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History.
    New York: Cambridge University Press. Vert. De opkomst van de westerse wereld. Een nieuwe economische geschiedenis. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.

  57. Ouchi, W.G.
    • [1979] A Conceptual Framework for the Design of Organizational Control Mechanisms.
      Management Science 235:833-48.

    • [1980] Markets, Bureaucracies, and Clans.
      Administrative Science Quarterly 25: 129-40.

    • [1981] Theory Z.
      Reading, MA: Addison Wesley.

  58. Parsons, Talcott / Smelser, Neil [1956]
    Economy and Society.
    London: Routledge.

  59. Perrow, Charles
    • [1970] A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations.
      Americal Sociological Review 32: 194-208.

    • [1981] Markets, Hierarchies and Hegemony: A Critique of Chandler and Williamson.
      In: A. Van de Van/W. Joyce (eds.) Perspectives on Organizational Design and Behavior. New York: John, pp. 371-86 and 403-4. Wiley.

    • [1984] Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies.
      New York: Random House.

    • [1986a] Complex Organizations. A Critical Essay. 3rd Edn.
      New York: Random House.

    • [1986a] Economic Theories of Organization.
      Theory & Society 15:11-45.

    • [1991] A Society of Organizations.
      Theory & Society 20:725-62.

    • [1992] Small-Firm Networks.
      In: Nohria/Eccles 1992:445-70.

  60. Polanyi, Karl

  61. Polanyi, Karl / Arensberg, Conrad M. / Pearson, Harry W. (eds.) [1957]
    Trade and Market in Early Empires.
    Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.

  62. Putterman, Louis [1986]
    On Some Recent Explanations of Why Capital Hires Labor
    In: L. Putterman (ed.) The Economic Nature of the Firm. Cambridge Eng.: Cambridge University Press.

  63. Riordian, Michael/Williamson, Oliver [1986]
    Asset Specificity and Economic Organization.
    International Journal of Industrial Organization.

  64. Rutherford, Malcolm [2001]
    Institutional Economics: Then and Now
    Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(3): 173-194

  65. Schelling, Thomas C. [1960]
    The Strategy of Conflict.
    Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press.

  66. Scott, W. Richard [1992]
    Organizations: Rational, Natural, and Open Systems.
    3 Ed. London: Prentice-Hall.

  67. Simon, Herbert A.
    • [1957] Models of Man.
      New York: Wiley.

    • [1961] Administrative Behavior. 2d ed.
      New York: Macmillan (oorspr. gepubliceerd in 1945).

    • [1972] Theories of Bounded Rationality
      In C.B., pp. 161-76

    • [1973] Applying Information Technology to Organization Design.
      Public Administrative Review 33:268-78.

    • [1981] The Sciences of the Artificial. (2nd Ed.).
      Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    • [1983] Reason in Human Affairs.
      Stanford: Stanford University Press.

    • [1991] Bounded Rationality and Organizational Learning.
      Organization Science 2(1):125-34.

  68. Spence, A. Michael [1974]
    Market Signaling.
    Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

  69. Smelser, Neil J. [1976]
    The Sociology of Economic Life.
    Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

  70. Smelser, Neil J. / Swedberg, Richard (eds.) [2005]
    Handbook of Economic Sociology.
    Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

  71. Swedberg, Richard
    • [1998] Max Weber and the Idea of Economic Sociology.
      Princeton University Press.

    • [1987] Economic Sociology: Past and Present.
      Current Sociology 35(1):1-221.

    • (ed.) [1990] Economics and Sociology.
      Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    • (ed.) [1993] Explorations in Economic Sociology.
      New York: Russel Sage Foundation.

  72. Swedberg, Richard/Granovetter, Mark (eds.) [2001]
    The Sociology of Economic Life.
    Boulder, Colorado: Westview.

  73. Teece, D.J.
    • [1977] Technology transfer by multinational firms.
      Economic Journal 87: 242-61.

    • [1981] Towards an economic theory of the multiproduct firm.
      Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 3: 39-64.

  74. White, Harrison, C.
    • [1970] Chains of Opportunity: System Models of Mobility in Organizations.
      Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

    • [1981a] Where Do Markets Come From?
      American Journal of Sociology 87: 517-47.

    • [1981b] Production Markets as Induced Role Structures.
      In: Samuel Leinhardt (ed.) Sociological Methodology. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, pp. 1-59

    • [1992] Agency as Control in Formal Networks.
      In: Nohria/Eccles 1992:92-117.

    • [2001] Markets from Networks: Socioeconomic Models of Production.
      Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

  75. Williamson, Oliver E.
    • [1963] A model of Rational Managerial Behavior.
      In: Cyert/March 1963: 237-52.

    • [1964] The Economics of Discretionary Behavior: Managerial Objectives in a Theory of the Firm.
      Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

    • [1970] Corporate Control and Business Behavior.
      Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

    • [1971] Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations.
      American Economic Review 61:233-61.

    • [1975] Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications.
      New York: Free Press.

    • [1979] Transaction Costs Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations.
      Journal of Economic Behavior and Organizations 4:57-62.

    • [1981] The Economics of Organization.
      American Journal of Sociology. 87: 548-77.

    • [1983] Technology and the Organization of Work.
      Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 4:57-62.

    • [1983a] Organizational Innovation: The Transaction Cost Approach.
      In J. Ronen (ed.) Entrepeneurship. Lexington. Mass.:Heath Lexington, pp. 101-34

    • [1983b] Organization Form, Residual Claimants and Corporate Control.
      Journal of Law and Economics. 36: 351-66.

    • [1983c] Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange.
      American Economic Review: 519-40.

    • [1984a] The Economics of Governance: Framework and Implications.
      American Economic Review. 73:195-223.

    • [1984b] Corporate Governance.
      Yale Law Journal 93.

    • [1984c] Perspectives on the Modern Corporation.
      Quarterly Review of Economics and Business. 24:64-71.

    • [1985] The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting.
      New York: Free Press.

    • [1986] Economic Organization: Firms, Markets and Policy Control.
      New York: New York University Press.

    • [1989] Internal Economic Organization.
      In: Williamson/Sjöstrand/Johanson 1989: 7-48.

    • [1990] The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties: an Introduction.
      In: M. Aoki/B. Gustafsson/E.O. Williamson (eds.) The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties. London. pp. 1-25.

    • [1991a] Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives.
      Adminstrative Science Quarterly 36(2): 269-96.

    • [1991b] Economic Institutions: Spontaneous and Intentional Governance.
      Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 7: 159-87.

    • [1991c] Strategizing, Economizing, and Economic Organization.
      Strategic Management Journal 12:75-94.

    • [1993a] The Evolving Science of Organization.
      In: Futubotn/Richter 1993:36-63.

    • [1993b] Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization.
      Journal of Law and Economics 36: 453-86.

    • [1994] Transaction Cost Economics and Organization Theory.
      In: Smelser/Swedberg 1994:77-107.

  76. Williamson, Oliver E./Ouchi, W.G.
    • [1983] The Markets and Hierarchies Program of Research: Origins, Implications, Prospects.
      In: A. Francis/J.Turk/P. Willman (eds.) Power, Efficiency and Institutions. London: Heinemann. Oorspr. in: W. Joyce/A. Van de Ven (eds.) (1981) Organizational Design. New York: Wiley.

    • [1983] The Markets and Hierarchies Programma of Research: origins, implications, prospects.
      In: A. Francis/J.Turk/P Willman (eds.) Power, Efficiency and Institutions. London.

  77. Williamson, Oliver/Sjöstrand, Sven-Erik/Johanson, Jan (eds.) [1989]
    Perspectives on the Economics of Organization.
    Lund, Sweden: Lund University Press.

  78. Williamson, Oliver/Winter, Sidney (eds.) [1991]
    The Nature of the Firm.
    New York: Oxford University Press.

  79. Zafirovski, Milan [2014]
    Rational Choice Requiem: The Decline of an Economic Paradigm and its Implications for Sociology.
    The American Sociologist 45: 432-452.


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